@servicetitan/standalone-core-feature-gatesnpm

npm/@servicetitan/standalone-core-feature-gates is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime binary from the oven-sh/bun v1.3.13 release, extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and then invokes the sibling file math_init.js under that freshly downloaded Bun runtime via execFileSync. math_init.js is a 727KB // @bun @bun-cjs bundle carrying obfuscator-style string-array rotation (function WV8StW(...) {... MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift()) }), a large mixed numeric/string constant array, and hex-mangled identifiers. The package's advertised purpose is a React feature-gate library that has no need for a second language runtime or for a multi-hundred-KB obfuscated blob. Using an alternate runtime to execute the obfuscated bundle bypasses Node-based install-time inspection and runs attacker-controlled code on any machine that runs npm install against this version. Version 1.11.4 also introduces this behavior for the first time — CHANGELOG.md's last entry is v1.11.3, package.json author is empty, and prior versions contain neither the preinstall hook, nor setup.mjs, nor math_init.js — consistent with a compromised release under an existing scope.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.