@servicetitan/react-iocnpm

npm/@servicetitan/react-ioc is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (javascript-obfuscator hex-mangled identifiers and per-function string-lookup tables hiding literals such as bun, ldd, --version, /etc/os-release, Alpine, and the download URL). It downloads a Bun runtime binary from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (v1.3.13), extracts and chmods it, then executes it via execFileSync against a sibling math_init.js shipped at the tarball root. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled bundle marked // @bun @bun-cjs whose strings are reconstructed at runtime from a shuffled numeric array (n7gIxM=[...]) plus a rotator (WV8StW) and custom decoder (hc1jfK9), so identifiers and any network endpoints are not visible statically. Neither math_init.js nor setup.mjs is declared in the files allowlist (["dist", "src"]), yet both are present in the published tarball and required by the preinstall hook. A React IoC library has no legitimate reason to fetch an alternate language runtime at install-time to execute an opaque bundled payload; this pairing (install-time fetch of a second interpreter used solely to run a bundled obfuscated script) matches the alternate-runtime-dropper attack shape and is consistent with a compromised-publisher or malicious-release scenario.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.