@servicetitan/quick-actionsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/quick-actions is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares preinstall node setup.mjs. setup.mjs constructs a URL against github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, downloads the Bun runtime at install time, then invokes execFileSync on the downloaded Bun binary to run the sibling file math_init.js from the package directory. math_init.js is a ~727KB script prefixed // @bun @bun-cjs and structured as a rotating string-array cipher (functions such as WV8StW shifting an array MmgoCP, a multi-thousand-entry constant table n7gIxM, hex-named identifiers _0x...) with no readable strings, so its behavior is opaque to inspection without executing the deobfuscator. The advertised package is a React UI component library (main ./dist/index.js, peer dependencies on React/mobx/@servicetitan/*) whose functionality has no relationship to fetching an alternate language runtime or executing a large opaque script at install. Fetching a non-Node runtime to execute bundled obfuscated code on npm install is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern, and the mismatch between advertised purpose and preinstall behavior is consistent with a namespace/package compromise.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.