@servicetitan/microfront-utilsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/microfront-utils is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall script setup.mjs is written with obfuscator.io-style hex-mangled identifiers and per-function dispatch objects around fs/https/zlib logic. At install time it checks whether bun is on PATH; if not, it downloads a Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts the binary to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it (execFileSync) against the package-local math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line Bun-tagged bundle using a shuffled string-array decoder (rotator function that shifts a mixed numeric/char table) with hex-mangled identifiers and no readable strings, so its behavior is opaque to Node-based inspection. The package is advertised as a React micro-frontend utility library and has no stated need for an alternate JS runtime at install; running the payload under Bun (rather than Node) means standard Node lifecycle-script scanners never execute the delivered code. The combination of alternate-runtime dropper delivery, an obfuscated install helper, and an obfuscated Bun-only payload whose contents cannot be reconciled with the advertised library is the install-time-RCE fingerprint.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.