@servicetitan/mfe-quick-actionsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/mfe-quick-actions is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The tarball for @servicetitan/[email protected] declares a React micro-frontend UI component (main:./dist/index.js with React/mobx dependencies and src/app.tsx), but ships an unrelated preinstall dropper. package.json scripts.preinstall runs node setup.mjs, which probes for a system bun binary and otherwise downloads bun-v1.3.13 from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases for the detected platform and architecture, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and uses that freshly-installed runtime to execEile the sibling file math_init.js from the package directory. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line // @bun @bun-cjs bundle with obfuscator.io-style identifiers, a large string-constant array, and a rotator function that shifts the array at load — its content cannot be characterized without deobfuscation. The declared React UI purpose has no need for a second JavaScript runtime or an opaque install-time payload; the preinstall path executes attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine on every npm install, and the use of a downloaded alternate runtime evades scanners that only trace Node-resolved code. The @servicetitan namespace and UI-library shape are inconsistent with the shipped install-time behavior, matching a compromised-publisher / namespace-hijack pattern.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.