@servicetitan/design-systemnpm

npm/@servicetitan/design-system is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall hook runs node setup.mjs, an obfuscated loader (obfuscator.io-style _0xNNNN identifiers with string-lookup indirection) that platform-detects, downloads the Bun runtime zip from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platform>.zip, extracts the bun binary to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727 KB heavily obfuscated JavaScript blob (// @bun @bun-cjs header, rotated string array n7gIxM, rotating decoder WV8StW) whose contents cannot be read statically. Neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is listed in the manifest's files whitelist (["dist", "readme.md"]) — they ship as undeclared root-level tarball blobs and execute on npm install with the developer's privileges. The package presents itself as @servicetitan/design-system, a React UI component library whose declared homepage is https://v1.anvil.servicetitan.com; a UI component library has no need to fetch an alternate JavaScript runtime and execute a 700+ KB opaque payload under it. The combination — obfuscated loader, alt-runtime fetch used to evade Node-based scanners, obfuscated payload smuggled outside the declared file list, and name impersonation of a legitimate scoped ServiceTitan package — is characteristic of a malicious republish that runs attacker-controlled code on the installer's host at install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.