@servicetitan/datadog-rumnpm

npm/@servicetitan/datadog-rum is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex identifiers such as _0x488df8, per-function string dictionaries mapping short keys to literals like "--version", "/etc/os-release", "bun"). At install time it downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/...zip, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync to run a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled artifact (// @bun @bun-cjs header followed by string-array shuffle obfuscation using functions WV8StW and dictionary n7gIxM); its filename is unrelated to the package's stated Datadog RUM configuration purpose and its behavior cannot be inspected from source. Fetching an alternate language runtime at install time to execute an opaque obfuscated payload compiled for that runtime is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: it evades Node-oriented static analysis and yields arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine on npm install. The obfuscation of the lifecycle script itself, the runtime/payload name mismatch, and the requirement of a second runtime purely to execute bundled code are each independent indicators of evasion intent.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.