@servicetitan/cp-mfenpm

npm/@servicetitan/cp-mfe is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Version 1.115.5 of @servicetitan/cp-mfe ships a preinstall lifecycle hook (scripts.preinstall: node setup.mjs) that, on npm install, downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13 to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-file Bun-CJS module (header // @bun @bun-cjs) heavily obfuscated with hex-named identifiers, a large numeric/string lookup table, and an array-rotation decoder (obfuscator.io style); it is not listed in package.json files (declared as ["dist", "src"]) but is shipped at the tarball root. The setup.mjs dropper itself is also obfuscated with hex-mangled identifiers and per-function property-name maps, and includes musl/Alpine detection (ldd --version, /etc/os-release) to select the appropriate Bun variant for Linux CI and container hosts. The package's advertised purpose is a browser React micro-frontend (MobX + react-router), which has no legitimate need for a second language runtime at install time or for an obfuscated Bun-compiled binary blob. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern intentionally bypasses tooling that only inspects Node-resolved code, and the obfuscated payload executes with the privileges of the installing user on any developer machine or CI host that runs npm install @servicetitan/[email protected].

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.