@servicetitan/contentfulnpm
@servicetitan/contentful is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11841) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.0.3, 0.0.4, 0.0.5…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @servicetitan/contentful (npm)
What this malware does
npm/@servicetitan/contentful is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads a Bun runtime binary from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases (or reuses a pre-existing bun), extracts it, marks it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file math_init.js — a 727KB heavily obfuscated Bun-CJS bundle (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) with obfuscator.io fingerprints (rotated string array, _0x/random identifiers, no recoverable strings or URLs). The obfuscated bundle is unrelated to the package's stated Contentful-helper purpose, and its content is only reachable through the downloaded alternate runtime, which bypasses Node-level instrumentation. The legitimate-looking dist/index.js re-export is decoupled from this install-time payload; the shape is consistent with a compromised-scope or typosquat publish under @servicetitan/* that ships an opaque payload while retaining the appearance of an ordinary library. Installing this version causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine under the downloaded Bun runtime.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @servicetitan/contentful (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @servicetitan/contentful across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@servicetitan/contentful is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @servicetitan/contentful was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @servicetitan/contentful before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Aikido Security · finder
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
- Socket Threat Research Team · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @servicetitan/contentful-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.