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Malicious package

@servicetitan/confirm-navigationnpm

@servicetitan/confirm-navigation is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11840) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 41.3.1, 41.3.2, 41.3.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @servicetitan/confirm-navigation (npm)

MAL-2026-11840
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @servicetitan/confirm-navigation

What this malware does

npm/@servicetitan/confirm-navigation is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's declared purpose is a small React confirm-navigation UI helper, but package.json sets scripts.preinstall to node setup.mjs, which on npm install downloads the Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against a bundled 727KB file math_init.js. If a system bun is already present, it is used directly instead. math_init.js is a @bun-compiled bundle using string-array rotation, hex-style identifier renaming, and a multi-thousand-entry opaque literal table with no readable correspondence to the advertised React functionality; the code path is designed to execute only under the downloaded Bun runtime, hiding its behavior from Node-based inspection. The genuine React source under dist/ is small and unrelated to the obfuscated bundle. Fetching a second language runtime at install time and using it to execute a large, opaque, purpose-mismatched payload is the alternate-runtime dropper shape and is inconsistent with a UI helper library. The @servicetitan scope and legitimate-looking repository/homepage are consistent with a compromised-maintainer or scope-hijack publication rather than an authentic ServiceTitan release.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

7 flagged
41.3.141.3.241.3.341.3.441.3.541.3.641.3.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
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Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @servicetitan/confirm-navigation (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @servicetitan/confirm-navigation across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @servicetitan/confirm-navigation is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @servicetitan/confirm-navigation was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks @servicetitan/confirm-navigation before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @servicetitan/confirm-navigation on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 41.3.1, 41.3.2, 41.3.3, 41.3.4, 41.3.5, 41.3.6, 41.3.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-r8gg-wq5x-89gpIN-MAL-2026-011408IN-MAL-2026-011994IN-MAL-2026-012204IN-MAL-2026-012698IN-MAL-2026-012569IN-MAL-2026-012199IN-MAL-2026-012670

References

Credits

  • Aikido Security · finder
  • Amazon Inspector · finder
  • SafeDep · finder
  • Socket Threat Research Team · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @servicetitan/confirm-navigation-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Explore

@servicetitan/confirm-navigation (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-11840 | O3 Security