@servicetitan/assist-utilsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/assist-utils is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs", which fires automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style _0xNNNN identifiers with string-dictionary indirection) and downloads the Bun runtime (bun-v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts the bun binary into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [<path to math_init.js>]) against the package-local math_init.js — a 727 KB Bun-format payload with rotating string-array obfuscation (WV8StW shift/rotate, mangled identifiers, opaque char-code table). The package presents itself as a React/MobX host-MFE utility library (main:./dist/index.js, CHANGELOG referencing servicetitan/ti-assist-fe), a purpose entirely inconsistent with pulling an alternate language runtime at install time to execute an obfuscated sibling bundle. The Bun runtime is used specifically to run code that is not Node-resolvable, evading scanners that only inspect JavaScript reachable from main. The pattern is the canonical alternate-runtime-dropper: legitimate runtime fetched from its official source, then used to execute attacker-controlled obfuscated bytes bundled with the package. Combined with the obfuscation of the preinstall script itself and the mismatch with the package's advertised purpose, this indicates either compromise of the @servicetitan publishing credentials or a scope-hijack publish.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.