@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-mwvnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-mwv is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package publishes under the @servicetitan npm scope but its declared main (dist/index.js) is a trivial re-export of ionicons icons with a stub ExampleComponent, empty README, and empty author — a metadata shape consistent with dependency-confusion impersonation of a private @servicetitan package. Its package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle hook (node setup.mjs) that, on npm install, downloads the Bun runtime binary from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a bundled math_init.js file. math_init.js is a 728KB single-line Bun-compiled script whose contents are obfuscated with a rotated string-array cipher (integer/charset table + array-shift rotator, @bun @bun-cjs header) and are unrelated to the package's advertised purpose of React components for mobile webviews. setup.mjs itself is obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator-style hex identifiers and per-function string maps, hiding the download-and-execute logic from reviewers. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern (fetch an alien runtime, then execute an opaque bundled payload under it) evades Node-based static scanners; the payload runs with the installer's privileges at npm install time inside developer and CI environments.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.