@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-mwvnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-mwv is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-mwv 0.0.10 ships a preinstall script (setup.mjs, invoked via scripts.preinstall: node setup.mjs) that performs platform/arch detection (including a musl/Alpine probe via ldd and /etc/os-release), downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime ZIP from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts and chmod+x's the bun/bun.exe binary into a temp directory, and then uses execFileSync to run the sibling file math_init.js under that freshly-downloaded second runtime. setup.mjs is heavily obfuscated in obfuscator.io style (hex-numbered identifiers, string-dispatcher property objects, indirect call thunks around every execFileSync, readFileSync, https.get, and chmodSync). math_init.js is a 727KB // @bun @bun-cjs bundle with a rotated string array and character-substitution string decoder over a scrambled 91-character alphabet, executed exclusively via the downloaded Bun binary and not referenced by any documented entrypoint. The advertised purpose is 'React components for mobile webviews', but dist/index.js is a two-line re-export of ionicons/icons and no webview components ship. The package sits under the @servicetitan corporate scope with an empty author field and cross-references a private servicetitan/hammer repo in CHANGELOG.md, consistent with a dependency-confusion squat against the ServiceTitan private scope. Installing the package auto-runs the preinstall dropper, causing arbitrary attacker-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine via a second runtime chosen to bypass Node-focused scanners.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.