@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-commonnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-common is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package advertises itself as a React UI component extension library, but its package.json declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is written with hex-mangled identifiers and property-lookup indirection (e.g. _0x488df8, _0x19328d.WuGMv="musl", _0x19328d.TdVzu="/etc/os-release"), fingerprints the installer's libc/distro via execFileSync("ldd", ["--version"]) and by reading /etc/os-release to detect musl/Alpine, then constructs a URL of the form https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<V>/<variant>.zip (selecting bun-linux-x64-musl-baseline on Alpine), downloads and extracts the Bun runtime, chmods it to 0755, and finally runs execFileSync(bun, ["math_init.js"]). math_init.js is a ~727 KB single-line obfuscator.io-style bundle with a shuffled string-array decoder (WV8StW performs push(shift()) rotation over a large mixed numeric/string array), so its behavior is not auditable from shipped source. The net effect on npm install is: fetch an alien runtime from a non-registry host and use it to execute a heavily-obfuscated bundled script on the installer's machine. A React component library has no legitimate need for the Bun runtime or an obfuscated multi-hundred-KB blob at install time, and executing the payload under Bun bypasses Node-based install-time inspection. This matches the alternate-runtime-dropper shape (obfuscated loader + alien-runtime execution of an opaque payload at preinstall) with a stated package purpose that does not justify any of it.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.