@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-chartsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-charts is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Package @servicetitan/[email protected] declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is hand-obfuscated (_0x-style identifier munging and string-lookup dispatch tables wrapping execFileSync/https.get/readFileSync), platform-branches to pick a Bun binary variant, downloads a Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platformBinary>.zip into a temp directory, unzips it, chmods the binary to 0755, and then execFileSync's the freshly downloaded Bun against the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a single ~727KB minified line tagged // @bun @bun-cjs (Bun bytecode/bundle format that Node cannot parse), containing a shuffled numeric/string array (n7gIxM), an array-rotate routine (WV8StW), and a base64-alphabet string-array decoder (hc1jfK9) — the standard string-array-decoder loader shape. The package advertises itself as a charts extension and has no legitimate reason to fetch a second language runtime at install time to execute an opaque obfuscated sibling. package.json metadata is empty (author, description, keywords) while the name occupies the @servicetitan scope and references an internal anvil2 component, consistent with a dependency-confusion / scope-impersonation lure. Installing the package runs attacker-chosen code under the Bun runtime on the installer's machine at npm install time; because the executed payload is Bun bytecode, its behavior cannot be inspected from the Node source alone.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.