@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-atlasnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-atlas is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

@servicetitan/[email protected] declares a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that automatically runs on npm install. setup.mjs is obfuscated and, when bun is not already on PATH, downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, chmods it executable in a temp directory, and uses that freshly downloaded runtime to execFileSync a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727 KB single-line // @bun @bun-cjs blob using obfuscator.io-style constructs (rotated string array with a WV8StW shifter, hex-mangled identifiers, custom-alphabet string decoder) and is not referenced by the library's dist/index.js entry point. The package is advertised as a ServiceTitan Anvil React UI extension and ships legitimate-looking React component code in dist/, but bundles an install-time payload unrelated to that stated purpose; package.json author, description, and keywords are empty. Invoking the payload through a second runtime that is downloaded on demand is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern used to evade Node-focused scanning; the obfuscated bytes run with the installer's user privileges the moment the package is installed.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.