@servicetitan/anvil-themesnpm

npm/@servicetitan/anvil-themes is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases (bun-v1.3.13), extracts it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727 KB heavily obfuscated Bun-CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header, string-array rotation function, char-code lookup tables reconstructing strings at runtime, single-letter mangled identifiers) with no relation to the package's declared purpose of design theme tokens. The public-facing dist/index.js is a 973-byte re-export of @servicetitan/tokens/core, which acts as a cover for the hostile preinstall path. Package metadata claims the @servicetitan scope with homepage v1.anvil.servicetitan.com and repository github:servicetitan/anvil, but the tarball ships an empty author, empty description, and the dropper chain — inconsistent with a legitimate first-party design-tokens release. Fetching an alternate JavaScript runtime at install time specifically to execute an opaque, obfuscated bundle evades Node-based analysis and gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on the host of any developer or CI system that runs npm install.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.