@service-suppliers/suppliersnpm
Malicious code in @service-suppliers/suppliers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it scrapes installer-side credentials: it iterates process.env matching a sensitive-key list (npm_token, github_token, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, artifactory_token, nexus_token, node_auth_token, npm_config__auth) and reads ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc,./.npmrc, and../.npmrc, then POSTs the collected secrets together with hostname, username, cwd, PATH, node/npm versions, default registry, and a private_registry_detected flag to https://oob.moika.tech/report. The registry-detection field is dependency-confusion targeting telemetry to identify high-value victims behind private registries. Second, it fetches a per-OS script from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux,mac,win}, writes it to os.tmpdir() as ._service-suppliers_init.sh/.bat, chmods 0755, and spawns it via /bin/sh or cmd.exe with detached/stdio:ignore — an unpinned external host unrelated to the claimed publisher, with no hash verification. The package self-identifies its payload as 'dependency-confusion-npm' and the public scope @service-suppliers/suppliers appears to squat an internal namespace. The 'authorized testing' label in the source provides no protection to any unintended installer that resolves this version from the public registry.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @service-suppliers/suppliers (version 9.9.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @service-suppliers/suppliers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@service-suppliers/suppliers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @service-suppliers/suppliers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @service-suppliers/suppliers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @service-suppliers/suppliers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.