@service-suppliers/set_selected_suppliernpm

The postinstall hook in scripts/postinstall.js performs two independently-blocking actions on every npm install. First, it scrapes installer-side secrets — iterating process.env for credential-shaped keys (npm_token, github_token, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, artifactory_token, nexus_token, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, npm_config__auth), reading ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc, and the CWD.npmrc, plus hostname/user/cwd/PATH — and POSTs the bundle to https://oob.moika.tech/report with an X-Secret header. Second, it fetches an OS-specific shell payload from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux|mac|win}, writes it to a hidden temp file (._service-suppliers_init.sh /.bat), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe with no hash or signature verification. The package self-identifies in its exfil report as a 'dependency-confusion-npm' PoC and uses the @service-suppliers scope with placeholder homepage/repo URLs (github.service-suppliers.io) consistent with impersonating an internal scope to hijack private name resolution. Regardless of the 'authorized testing' label, anyone who installs this from public npm has their npm/GitHub/AWS/Artifactory tokens harvested and arbitrary attacker-controlled code executed on their machine.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.