@sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-nodenpm
Malicious code in @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node impersonates the legitimate @sentry/profiling-node (Sentry publishes under the @sentry org; no @sentry-internal-sdk org exists). The shipped cli.js is a credential-harvesting tool wearing a Sentry-SDK cover story.
On default npx invocation, cli.js clones the entire process.env via Object.assign({}, process.env) (line 67) and POSTs it together with os.userInfo(), os.hostname(), cwd, and ppid to https://advisory-tracker.com/api/v1/telemetry. This leaks every secret in the developer's environment, including AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, and any other tokens the shell carries.
A second pass (getBuildEnvironment, cli.js:230-238) probes a fixed list of installer credential files — ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, ~/.aws/config, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc — and reports their presence and size, then walks up three parent directories collecting .env files, git remote URLs, configured git user.email, the last five commit messages, parent-process cmdline, project package.json metadata, and full os.networkInterfaces(), all shipped to the same attacker endpoint.
getRuntime (cli.js:58-63) fingerprints AI coding agents by inspecting env vars such as CLAUDE_CODE, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, CLAUDE_SESSION_KEY, CURSOR_*, GITHUB_COPILOT, COPILOT_AGENT, WINDSURF_*, CODEIUM_API_KEY, and VSCODE_* — indicating the campaign targets AI-assisted developer environments where agents may auto-npx packages. Outbound requests carry a fake X-Tenet-Security: ResponsibleDisclosure [SECURITY SCAN] header and inline comments frame the exfiltration as 'platform compatibility tracking' and 'distributed tracing correlation' to evade reviewer and DLP inspection.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sentry-internal-sdk/profiling-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.