Which versions of @sciagent/cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of @sciagent/cli are flagged malicious: 1.0.68, 1.0.69. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @sciagent/cli if I installed it?

@sciagent/cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @sciagent/cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @sciagent/cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @sciagent/cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @sciagent/cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010762, IN-MAL-2026-010757 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @sciagent/cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sciagent/cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sciagent/cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@sciagent/clinpm

Malicious code in @sciagent/cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10718

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @sciagent/cli

What this malware does

scripts/postinstall.js fetches a ~10MB+ 'sciagent' executable over HTTPS from https://u250924-adc6-f977430f.westb.seetacloud.com:8443 (a rented seetacloud.com subdomain that does not match the package's declared publisher), writes it to ~/.sciagent/bin/sciagent, chmods it 0755, and the CLI shim subsequently spawns it. No hash, signature, or publisher check is performed on the fetched bytes; the URL is also overridable via a RELEASE_SERVER_URL environment variable. A fallback branch runs an unpinned npm install -g @tencent-ai/codebuddy-code at postinstall time and writes a wrapper that requires the resolved codebuddy-headless.js, so whatever version of that unrelated third-party package is current at install time is auto-installed globally and loaded by the sciagent CLI. Publisher metadata (gitee garva/research-agent, 'SciAgent Team') does not match either the seetacloud host or the poisondrinker/research-agent GitHub fallback referenced in the same script. Installing the package causes the installer's machine to execute opaque bytes retrieved from a non-publisher host at install time.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.681.0.69

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

310123a94891174b8cfa55def38b6e916b89d43306a52793739f26289fe51e4d

f293746cfa28ddea655cd5823c78429c8027bef305862c586699d48ffc74918c

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sciagent/cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sciagent/cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@sciagent/cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @sciagent/cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sciagent/cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @sciagent/cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.68, 1.0.69 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010762IN-MAL-2026-010757

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @sciagent/cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring