Which versions of @sanzoffc/baileys are malicious?

The following npm versions of @sanzoffc/baileys are flagged malicious: 3.0.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @sanzoffc/baileys if I installed it?

Remove @sanzoffc/baileys from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed @sanzoffc/baileys — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @sanzoffc/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @sanzoffc/baileys part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @sanzoffc/baileys is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-020178 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @sanzoffc/baileys across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sanzoffc/baileys (version 3.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sanzoffc/baileys across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@sanzoffc/baileysnpm

@sanzoffc/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16281) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 3.0.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @sanzoffc/baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-16281

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @sanzoffc/baileys

What this malware does

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds covert remote-controlled behavior driven by the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session. In lib/Socket/socket.js, socketConnect() (invoked from validateConnection on every WebSocket open) reconstructs a URL from a String.fromCharCode char-code array that resolves to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json, fetches that JSON list, and iterates it to issue WhatsApp GraphQL mutations with query_id 7871414976211147 (newsletter subscribe/follow) for each id in the remote-supplied list. The list is hosted on a mutable personal-GitHub branch controlled by a third party, so whoever edits that file determines which actions the installer's WhatsApp account performs. A second helper (generateMessageV) base64+XOR-decodes (key 23) a hardcoded '@newsletter' JID and pairs it with the same query_id 7871414976211147, then schedules the same subscription action 40 seconds after invocation - layered string obfuscation of a fixed destination JID that has no legitimate purpose in a WhatsApp protocol library. The behavior is not documented, not caller-configurable, and the URL and JID are deliberately obfuscated to evade string scanners. The manifest additionally declares '@whiskeysockets/eslint-config' as an unpinned github: source and pins most other dependencies to '*', widening the resolution trust boundary.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.0.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4393cd98419ed1fce683c0fde038bce830873769d85d69e64674df61f68502bc

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sanzoffc/baileys (version 3.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sanzoffc/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @sanzoffc/baileys from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @sanzoffc/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sanzoffc/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @sanzoffc/baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.0.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-020178

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @sanzoffc/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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