@salem_jalal/osc-componentsnpm
Malicious code in @salem_jalal/osc-components (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's postinstall hook (install.js, wired via package.json scripts.postinstall) runs on every npm install and transmits installer host identifiers — hostname, OS platform/arch, username, current working directory, Node version, npm registry env, and DNS server list — to http://dm-tech.ly:8001/poc-osc/callback over plain HTTP as a URL-encoded query parameter. The main module (index.js) contains an IIFE that, when loaded in a browser context (e.g., bundled into a downstream web app), harvests document.cookie, all localStorage entries, the current URL, and userAgent, and ships them to http://dm-tech.ly:8001/poc-osc/exfil with credentials:'include'. Although published under the personal scope @salem_jalal, the payload self-identifies internally as @dx-ui/osc-components at the same version 1981.17.7, indicating a dependency-confusion / namespace-impersonation attack against the @dx-ui scope. Console and path strings labeled [PoC] / poc-osc are cover framing; the code runs unconditionally on real installers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @salem_jalal/osc-components (version 1981.17.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @salem_jalal/osc-components across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@salem_jalal/osc-components is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @salem_jalal/osc-components was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @salem_jalal/osc-components before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @salem_jalal/osc-components-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.