@rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-managernpm
@rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17289) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall script that executes inline Node code reading os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username and issuing an HTTP GET to http://127.0.0.1:8099/ carrying those identifiers along with the impersonated package name. The package is published under @rutxploit-sec but its manifest description and index.js console output identify it as representing the private scope @subsplash/google-tag-manager, and any installer whose resolver picks this public name over the intended private package will execute the preinstall code and disclose hostname and username. The beacon destination in this artifact is loopback (127.0.0.1:8099), consistent with a proof-of-concept collector rather than a live external C2, but the install-time execution primitive and dependency-confusion targeting are the full attack shape.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @rutxploit-sec/subsplash-google-tag-manager-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.