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Malicious package

@rixxcodex/baileysnpm

Advisory published Updated

@rixxcodex/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16483) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 8.0.15, 8.0.16, 8.1.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @rixxcodex/baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-16483
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @rixxcodex/baileys

What this malware does

Versions 9.0.0, 9.0.1 and 9.0.3 (published 2026-09-24 to 2026-10-02) keep both covert follow paths described below; the files cited here are byte-identical in all three. lib/Utils/messages-media.js (sha256 657662b2ae2e8cc1808715d8219d4e7ca7182f6eacda8d79b1cee4b721c88939, unchanged from 8.2.0) is called from makeNewsletterSocket on every socket creation; 80 seconds later it fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/Screaper/refs/heads/main/idChannel.json (stored base64) and sends QueryIds.FOLLOW for each id. lib/Socket/socket.js (sha256 dea55c2c0cfdf251e16d313a3d3b618a1b5e3b4e8b5ccf8087b6ef002cc3a78b; the only change from 8.2.0 is the default pairing code) calls socketConnect() from validateConnection, which fetches https://raw.github.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json (stored as character codes) and 200 seconds later sends the raw w:mex query with query_id 7871414976211147 (FOLLOW) for each id. Errors are swallowed and the user is not told. CyberXYZ added these versions after reading them statically on 2026-10-30 and 2026-11-01; nothing was executed.

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds three undocumented channels which use the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to perform account actions chosen by the author at runtime. In lib/Socket/socket.js around line 334, a base64-encoded URL decodes to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/Screaper/refs/heads/main/idChannel.json; loadBase is invoked unconditionally from makeNewsletterSocket on every socket creation and, for each id returned by that mutable list, calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) on the connected account. A second helper (socketConnect, called from validateConnection when the WebSocket opens) reconstructs the URL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json from a numeric char-code array (String.fromCharCode(...)) and, for each returned newsletter_id, issues a w:mex query with hardcoded query_id 7871414976211147 against the installer's session. A third helper, generateMessageV, is exposed on the socket API and, after a 40 second delay, invokes its callback with a hardcoded @newsletter JID obfuscated as a base64 blob XORed with the constant 23, again paired with query_id 7871414976211147. None of these behaviors are described in the README, and both remote lists are runtime-mutable by the author. In addition, package.json declares the cryptographic dependency "@rixxcodex/libsignal": "github:RixxCode/libsignal" with no tag or commit SHA, so npm install resolves whatever HEAD of that repository currently contains and executes it inside the Signal session-encryption path with no integrity check.

Malicious versions

7 flagged
8.0.158.0.168.1.08.2.09.0.09.0.19.0.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

276a57485a06d9d1d3ff8df8393ecffaa7d78f1d83c4e4964b53f14c58de7fa3
8222bb9b13299dd38f26091a058cd44d0d572e81a77394fb14a7851d0772c124
58b5247e2f10d09b51e8d59c4b36cb2cbe62909af4be588fdb07dabf0afabcf2
7b0dbc2dcacd94b03ada3e4eb57692604b7e073c98474752c00faa31aac891a2

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access
  1. Find it

    Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @rixxcodex/baileys (7 malicious versions).

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @rixxcodex/baileys establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @rixxcodex/baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @rixxcodex/baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 8.0.15, 8.0.16, 8.1.0, 8.2.0, 9.0.0, 9.0.1, 9.0.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-020501IN-MAL-2026-020502IN-MAL-2026-020499IN-MAL-2026-020500

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder
  • CyberXYZ · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @rixxcodex/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Explore

@rixxcodex/baileys (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-16483 | O3 Security