@rixxcodex/baileysnpm
@rixxcodex/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16483) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 8.0.15, 8.0.16, 8.1.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @rixxcodex/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds three undocumented channels which use the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to perform account actions chosen by the author at runtime. In lib/Socket/socket.js around line 334, a base64-encoded URL decodes to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/Screaper/refs/heads/main/idChannel.json; loadBase is invoked unconditionally from makeNewsletterSocket on every socket creation and, for each id returned by that mutable list, calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) on the connected account. A second helper (socketConnect, called from validateConnection when the WebSocket opens) reconstructs the URL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json from a numeric char-code array (String.fromCharCode(...)) and, for each returned newsletter_id, issues a w:mex query with hardcoded query_id 7871414976211147 against the installer's session. A third helper, generateMessageV, is exposed on the socket API and, after a 40 second delay, invokes its callback with a hardcoded @newsletter JID obfuscated as a base64 blob XORed with the constant 23, again paired with query_id 7871414976211147. None of these behaviors are described in the README, and both remote lists are runtime-mutable by the author. In addition, package.json declares the cryptographic dependency "@rixxcodex/libsignal": "github:RixxCode/libsignal" with no tag or commit SHA, so npm install resolves whatever HEAD of that repository currently contains and executes it inside the Signal session-encryption path with no integrity check.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @rixxcodex/baileys (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @rixxcodex/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @rixxcodex/baileys from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @rixxcodex/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @rixxcodex/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @rixxcodex/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.