@resolvx/corenpm
Malicious code in @resolvx/core (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js connects to a hardcoded attacker IP (http://213.218.160.189:8080, fallback:80), sends a base64-encoded host fingerprint (hostname, username, platform, arch) as the q query parameter, optionally XOR-decrypts the HTTP response with an embedded hex key, writes the decrypted bytes to a hidden file (.node_<rand>.js) under /tmp or %LOCALAPPDATA%/Temp, spawns it as a detached Node process with stdio ignored and windowsHide set, calls unref(), and deletes the staging file ~5 seconds later. The script also performs anti-analysis checks (scans tasklist for wireshark/fiddler/procmon/x64dbg/ida), introduces a randomized 0.5–2.5s start delay, and skips execution when npm_config_dry_run is set to evade dry-run inspection. The combination of plaintext HTTP fetch from a bare IP, payload decryption, hidden filename staging, detached background execution, and anti-analysis gating is a textbook install-time dropper that yields full code execution on the installer's machine and exfiltrates host identification to the attacker for follow-on targeting.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @resolvx/core (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @resolvx/core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@resolvx/core is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @resolvx/core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @resolvx/core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @resolvx/core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.