@public-for-cdao/typesnpm
@public-for-cdao/types is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10604) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 99.99.99). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @public-for-cdao/types (npm)
What this malware does
The @public-for-cdao/types package is part of a dependency-confusion credential theft campaign. Its package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs node recon.js automatically during npm installation. The bundled recon.js is identical across six packages in the @public-for-cdao scope and has SHA-256 3dd1f7827fe311d17f442e0af0fab46f3f1a938bb3409838536795fb1aa0f740.
The script collects CI tokens, GitLab access tokens, SSH and deployment keys, AWS credentials, database and Redis passwords, private keys, cryptocurrency mnemonics and seed phrases, Docker and npm credentials, and Slack and Discord tokens from environment variables. It also searches common project, application, root, and CI-runner locations for .env files and extracts lines containing KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASS, PRIVATE, or MNEMONIC. The package name, version, hostname, and collected secrets are POSTed to a fixed webhook.site endpoint and a Pipedream endpoint with TLS certificate verification disabled.
The package's postinstall script (scripts.postinstall = 'node recon.js') runs automatically on npm install and performs an installer-side credential and reconnaissance harvest. recon.js collects os.hostname(), platform, arch, user, and cwd; enumerates approximately 40 CI/CD, cloud, and wallet-related environment variables including AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, GitLab tokens, database and Redis passwords, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, and SEED_PHRASE; reads.env files at common paths via fs.readFileSync; and lists directories under /builds, /home/gitlab-runner/builds/, /tmp/, and /var/lib/gitlab-runner/. The collected JSON payload is POSTed via https.request to webhook.site (path /d6d18927-e513-4df7-b019-58bfc64fe0dd) and to enqoojbegdvxj.x.pipedream.net. The package name (@public-for-cdao/types), the pinned version 99.99.99, index.js exporting { name: '@cdao/types', version: '99.99.99' } as a stub, and the in-file comment 'CryptoDAO Dependency Confusion Reconnaissance Payload' identify this as a targeted dependency-confusion attack against an internal '@cdao/types' package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @public-for-cdao/types (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @public-for-cdao/types across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@public-for-cdao/types is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @public-for-cdao/types was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/types before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
- YoSheep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/types-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.