@public-for-cdao/confignpm
Malicious code in @public-for-cdao/config (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package ships a postinstall script (recon.js) that runs at npm install time. It collects host identifiers (hostname, platform, arch, username, cwd), enumerates roughly 30 sensitive environment variables (including AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, DB_PASSWORD), reads.env files from paths such as.env, /app/.env, /root/.env, and greps for lines matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/PRIVATE/MNEMONIC. It also enumerates CI build directories under /builds/, /home/gitlab-runner/builds/, and /var/lib/gitlab-runner/. The collected data is serialized as JSON and HTTP POSTed via https.request to two attacker-controlled collectors: webhook.site/d6d18927-e513-4df7-b019-58bfc64fe0dd and enqoojbegdvxj.x.pipedream.net. The package name and 99.99.99 version are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal @public-for-cdao/config scope.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @public-for-cdao/config (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @public-for-cdao/config across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@public-for-cdao/config is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @public-for-cdao/config was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/config before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/config-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.