Which versions of @public-for-cdao/api are malicious?

The following npm versions of @public-for-cdao/api are flagged malicious: 99.99.99. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @public-for-cdao/api if I installed it?

@public-for-cdao/api is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @public-for-cdao/api — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @public-for-cdao/api was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @public-for-cdao/api part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @public-for-cdao/api is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010543, RLMA-2026-05446, RLUA-2026-05902 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @public-for-cdao/api across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @public-for-cdao/api (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @public-for-cdao/api across your stack and pipelines.

Part of a larger attack: @public-for-cdao published 15 malicious packages. See the full campaign →

Malicious package

@public-for-cdao/apinpm

@public-for-cdao/api is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10600) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 99.99.99). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @public-for-cdao/api (npm)

MAL-2026-10600

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @public-for-cdao/api

What this malware does

The @public-for-cdao/api package is part of a dependency-confusion credential theft campaign. Its package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs node recon.js automatically during npm installation. The bundled recon.js is identical across six packages in the @public-for-cdao scope and has SHA-256 3dd1f7827fe311d17f442e0af0fab46f3f1a938bb3409838536795fb1aa0f740.

The script collects CI tokens, GitLab access tokens, SSH and deployment keys, AWS credentials, database and Redis passwords, private keys, cryptocurrency mnemonics and seed phrases, Docker and npm credentials, and Slack and Discord tokens from environment variables. It also searches common project, application, root, and CI-runner locations for .env files and extracts lines containing KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASS, PRIVATE, or MNEMONIC. The package name, version, hostname, and collected secrets are POSTed to a fixed webhook.site endpoint and a Pipedream endpoint with TLS certificate verification disabled.

@public-for-cdao/[email protected] is a high-version public squat of a presumed private @cdao/api scope (index.js exports name '@cdao/api'; package description 'CryptoDAO api module - internal use'). package.json declares a postinstall script that runs recon.js on npm install. recon.js enumerates a curated list of ~30 CI/CD, cloud, wallet, and registry secret environment variables (including AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, CI_JOB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN, DOCKER_PASSWORD, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC), scans multiple.env file paths for lines matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/PRIVATE/MNEMONIC, collects host identifiers (hostname, OS, arch, username, cwd) and directory listings of /builds/, /home/gitlab-runner/builds/, /tmp/, and /var/lib/gitlab-runner/, and HTTPS-POSTs the aggregated payload with rejectUnauthorized:false to two hardcoded exfiltration endpoints: https://webhook.site/d6d18927-e513-4df7-b019-58bfc64fe0dd and https://enqoojbegdvxj.x.pipedream.net. The recon.js header comment self-labels the file as 'CryptoDAO Dependency Confusion Reconnaissance Payload'.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

99.99.99

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4d844c4af5615aa5e7eb8470e79d2e95b841e91a8a23df81bafdb56f656b0111

5c7d140b9ef12f807d2168ddcf80bf8d7ddabf032e6463dd8b521c3d309f2587

e6eb83418d6baab46f8afe615ec3455b79bf925558fe211edcc22eb1c26f3e31

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @public-for-cdao/api (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @public-for-cdao/api across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@public-for-cdao/api is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @public-for-cdao/api was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/api before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @public-for-cdao/api on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.99.99 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010543RLMA-2026-05446RLUA-2026-05902

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
ReversingLabs · finder
YoSheep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/api-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database