@public-for-cdao/apinpm
Malicious code in @public-for-cdao/api (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@public-for-cdao/[email protected] is a high-version public squat of a presumed private @cdao/api scope (index.js exports name '@cdao/api'; package description 'CryptoDAO api module - internal use'). package.json declares a postinstall script that runs recon.js on npm install. recon.js enumerates a curated list of ~30 CI/CD, cloud, wallet, and registry secret environment variables (including AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, CI_JOB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN, DOCKER_PASSWORD, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC), scans multiple.env file paths for lines matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/PRIVATE/MNEMONIC, collects host identifiers (hostname, OS, arch, username, cwd) and directory listings of /builds/, /home/gitlab-runner/builds/, /tmp/, and /var/lib/gitlab-runner/, and HTTPS-POSTs the aggregated payload with rejectUnauthorized:false to two hardcoded exfiltration endpoints: https://webhook.site/d6d18927-e513-4df7-b019-58bfc64fe0dd and https://enqoojbegdvxj.x.pipedream.net. The recon.js header comment self-labels the file as 'CryptoDAO Dependency Confusion Reconnaissance Payload'.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @public-for-cdao/api (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @public-for-cdao/api across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@public-for-cdao/api is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @public-for-cdao/api was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/api before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @public-for-cdao/api-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.