@ppa-web-components/ppa-bannernpm
Advisory published Updated
@ppa-web-components/ppa-banner is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18272) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 0.0.1, 1.0.0, 1.0.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @ppa-web-components/ppa-banner (npm)
What this malware does
@ppa-web-components/ppa-banner is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (3.0.0, 1.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.1.0, 0.0.1, 2.0.1, 1.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs node beacon.cjs on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint.
@ppa-web-components/[email protected] is described as a 'Compatibility shim' but ships only two code paths: a no-op Proxy as its main export, and beacon.cjs. beacon.cjs defines BEACON = "http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc" and a fire() function that POSTs a JSON payload containing the package name, os.hostname(), the install path (__dirname), process.cwd(), and the Node/npm version to that bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint. fire() is invoked both from the postinstall lifecycle hook (node beacon.cjs) and from the module's main entry, so the beacon fires automatically on npm install and again whenever the package is required. The destination is an unrelated bare IP over cleartext HTTP, not any publisher-controlled or registry infrastructure, and the shipped stub has no functional purpose other than the beacon. The scoped-name + stub + install-time recon beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion recon callback used to identify internal build environments that resolved this public name.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @ppa-web-components/ppa-banner (7 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@ppa-web-components/ppa-banner establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @ppa-web-components/ppa-banner was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- InvisiRisk, Inc. · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ppa-web-components/ppa-banner-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.