@pluxee-connect/api-clientnpm
Malicious code in @pluxee-connect/api-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), and process.version and transmits them over plain HTTP to 716bw4e4k31qif2nc1v658fb62ct0soh.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction subdomain), with DNS resolution providing a second exfil channel via subdomain encoding. The package itself is a near-empty shell — index.js exports only a ConsentsStatus enum — and is published at version 99.0.1, far above any plausible legitimate release for the @pluxee-connect scope. The structural shape (high-bumped version + trivial functional surface + lifecycle-time OOB beacon to oastify.com) is the canonical dependency-confusion attack against an internal scope. Any developer or CI system that resolves @pluxee-connect/api-client from public npm will leak machine identifiers to the attacker.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @pluxee-connect/api-client (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @pluxee-connect/api-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@pluxee-connect/api-client establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @pluxee-connect/api-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @pluxee-connect/api-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @pluxee-connect/api-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.