@pluxee-connect/account-db-api-clientnpm
Malicious code in @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Version 99.0.0 of this package targets an internal-looking npm scope and ships a postinstall.js that, on every npm install, reads os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.version, and the package name and transmits them to the third-party OAST domain d84t2rmqt3fpphmbii3gf9sdi63c3gkp7.oast.online over both HTTP GET (port 80) and DNS lookup. The package's main entry (index.js) is a placeholder stub containing only a ConsentsStatus enum with a comment self-describing it as a PoC stub mirroring the real package's API. The combination of an inflated 99.0.0 version, a hollow API surface, and an unconditional install-time beacon to an interactsh out-of-band exfiltration host on a scope that resembles an internal Pluxee namespace is a textbook dependency-confusion attack: any build system misresolving the internal name to this public package leaks host identity to the attacker's OAST listener.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @pluxee-connect/account-db-api-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.