Which versions of @payment-review/store are malicious?

The following npm versions of @payment-review/store are flagged malicious: 99.0.0, 99.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @payment-review/store if I installed it?

@payment-review/store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @payment-review/store — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @payment-review/store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @payment-review/store part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @payment-review/store is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005081, IN-MAL-2026-005080, IN-MAL-2026-005137, IN-MAL-2026-005136 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @payment-review/store across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @payment-review/store (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @payment-review/store across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@payment-review/storenpm

Malicious code in @payment-review/store (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5427

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @payment-review/store

What this malware does

package.json declares preinstall: node index.js || true, so installing the package automatically runs index.js on npm install. The script collects host identity fields — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, process.cwd(), and the package id — serializes them as JSON, and exfiltrates them via two channels: (1) an HTTP POST to the hardcoded bare IP http://172.201.213.59:9090/c, and (2) a hex-encoded DNS resolution against a subdomain of d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live (Interactsh out-of-band exfiltration). The package metadata (@payment-review/store, version 99.0.0, description security research, no real functionality) matches the dependency-confusion shape: a high version number under a target-org-styled scope intended to override an internal private package of the same name. Installing this package leaks the installer's host and user identity to attacker-controlled infrastructure with no user consent.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

99.0.099.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0d4410dd7531b8073ca94b67e1f378c1384acfe969b9b8a12ed934be962b1565

16277824e707bfa5d164fe338408172b64a7e3c02ee6669b1391b8ad1ae41965

98ffd07a5d66d1101647686e7de8afd31b09a0af01aa3118a9de460089751408

2d624eaefbb0245bf0c9a7b598c461a3ba5ec48005cfec223898062741ef8c2e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @payment-review/store (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @payment-review/store across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@payment-review/store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @payment-review/store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @payment-review/store before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @payment-review/store on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 99.0.0, 99.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005081IN-MAL-2026-005080IN-MAL-2026-005137IN-MAL-2026-005136

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @payment-review/store-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring