@ornikar/typed-css-modules-loadernpm

npm/@ornikar/typed-css-modules-loader is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

@ornikar/[email protected] is presented as a webpack loader for typed-css-modules but on install runs an attacker-controlled dropper. The package.json preinstall script invokes setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, extracts and chmods the Bun binary, and uses it to execute a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D, 'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D}). math_init.js is a single-line ~700KB Bun-compiled CJS bundle beginning with // @bun @bun-cjs followed by a large hex opcode/data table (const n7gIxM=[0x0,0x1,0x8,0xff,"length",...]) with no plain-text identifiers, URLs, or function names; setup.mjs itself is obfuscated with hex-mangled identifiers (_0x488df8 style) despite implementing only a download-and-exec flow. The Bun runtime executes the bundle outside Node-based scanners and outside npm's script visibility. The payload's name (math_init) has no relation to the advertised webpack-loader purpose. The package also shows a scope/author mismatch: name is under the @ornikar org scope, but repository, homepage, bugs, and author (Oleg Stepura) all point at the unrelated olegstepura/typed-css-modules-loader upstream, consistent with a scope-squat wrapping a dropper around an existing package identity.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.