@ornikar/stylelint-confignpm

npm/@ornikar/stylelint-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

@ornikar/[email protected] declares a preinstall hook (scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs") that runs on npm install. The setup.mjs script is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex-mangled identifiers and string-lookup tables) and downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platform>.zip, extracts and chmods the binary, then invokes it via execFileSync against a sibling file math_init.js. If bun is already on PATH, it invokes bun math_init.js directly. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line Bun-CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header, array-shuffle decoder, large numeric/string constant array) — an opaque obfuscated payload executed at install time. The package advertises itself as a stylelint configuration and declares main: index.js, but no index.js is present in the tarball; the only executable content is the preinstall dropper and the obfuscated bundle. A stylelint configuration package has no legitimate reason to fetch an alternate JS runtime and execute a bundled obfuscated payload during install. The combination of install-time alternate-runtime fetch, obfuscation of both the loader and the payload, missing advertised entry point, and package/purpose mismatch is consistent with a hijacked or typosquatted release of the @ornikar/stylelint-config name.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.