@ornikar/repo-config-reactnpm

npm/@ornikar/repo-config-react is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Version 13.0.9 introduces a preinstall lifecycle hook (node setup.mjs) that is heavily obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style _0xNNNN identifiers and string-lookup dispatchers (e.g. _0x19328d.YCZJE(execFileSync,...)). At install time it constructs a platform-specific URL for the Bun runtime v1.3.13 (https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip), downloads and unzips it into a temporary directory, marks the binary executable via chmodSync(..., 493), and then invokes that Bun binary against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727 KB opaque Bun-compiled CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs) whose literals are encoded through a numeric lookup table (n7gIxM) and a shift-rotate decoder (WV8StW), rendering the executed code unreadable to Node-oriented scanners. The package's declared purpose is a shared React repo-config; the CHANGELOG through 13.0.7 documents only version bumps and Node upgrades, with no reference to Bun, setup.mjs, or math_init.js. Fetching a second JS runtime and executing an obfuscated compiled bundle on npm install is inconsistent with the declared purpose and prior release history, and matches the alternate-runtime dropper pattern used to evade static analysis.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.