@ornikar/jest-config-react-native-webnpm

npm/@ornikar/jest-config-react-native-web is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares preinstall: node setup.mjs in package.json. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temp directory, extracts the platform-specific binary, chmods it executable (0o755), and invokes it via execFileSync against the bundled math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727 KB single-line file with a // @bun @bun-cjs header containing a shuffled string-array decoder (WV8StW), hex-named variables (_0xNNNN), and a char-code table — heavily obfuscated Bun-compiled code that is not human-inspectable and bears no relation to a jest/react-native-web preset. The advertised jest preset entrypoint jest-preset.js throws unconditionally on require (throw new Error('Use @ornikar/jest-config-react-native/web instead')), providing zero library functionality; the only active surface of the package is the preinstall dropper. Executing the payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime evades Node-level tooling. The download source (Bun releases) is legitimate for Bun, but the bundled code it is used to execute is attacker-supplied and obfuscated, and the package's stated jest-config purpose does not require a second language runtime. Installing this package causes arbitrary code execution on the installer's host at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.