@ornikar/intl-confignpm

npm/@ornikar/intl-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Version 10.0.10 was added to this record on 2026-08-06, when it differed from the versions above in one important way: it was still published. As of that date the registry had unpublished 10.0.2 through 10.0.9 — those versions survived only in the packument time map and were absent from versions — while 10.0.10, the last republish of the burst, had been left in place and still held the latest dist-tag, so a default npm install @ornikar/intl-config still resolved to a poisoned release. The 10.0.10 manifest replaces every real script with a single "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" entry, carries no gitHead, was published at 2026-08-04T12:44:09.580Z by the same maintainer account as the preceding legitimate releases, and declares dist.unpackedSize 759999 against 21369 for the last clean release (10.0.1). A file listing of the published tarball shows the two extra files 10.0.10 adds over 10.0.1: setup.mjs (11017 bytes) and math_init.js (727680 bytes), whose sha256 digests match the campaign payload already recorded in this report's evidence_files; the same two files, byte for byte, are also in @ornikar/react-native-svg-transformer 1.0.13. Wiz Research and OX Security both list 10.0.10 in their published IoC sets for this campaign. Consumers should not resolve this package from latest or a floating range: pin to 10.0.1 or earlier, audit lockfiles for 10.0.10, and treat any host or CI runner that installed it with install scripts enabled as compromised.

Version 10.0.7 of @ornikar/intl-config, an internal-facing FormatJS/intl configuration helper, ships a preinstall lifecycle hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<arch>.zip, extracts and chmods the bun binary, and then runs execFileSync(bun, ['math_init.js']). math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-CJS bundle (leading // @bun @bun-cjs marker) obfuscated with a rotated string-array (function WV8StW(...) shifting n7gIxM=[...]) and hex-mangled identifiers. The driver setup.mjs is itself obfuscator.io-style minified with identifiers like _0x488df8, _0x52943e and property-mangling maps. The payload filename and content bear no relation to the package's advertised purpose (intl/FormatJS configuration) and the package has no legitimate need for a second language runtime. The preinstall fires automatically on npm install, causing opaque author-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine under a runtime that Node-based supply-chain scanners do not follow. This is the alternate-runtime dropper pattern: an unrelated runtime is fetched at install time specifically to execute a bundled obfuscated payload, evading review.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.