@ornikar/eslint-config-nodenpm

npm/@ornikar/eslint-config-node is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

This version of the package, advertised as an ESLint configuration, ships a preinstall hook (scripts.preinstall: "node setup.mjs") that downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh/bun GitHub release archive (bun-v1.3.13) into a temporary directory, chmods the binary executable, and then invokes it to execute a bundled, heavily obfuscated 727KB JavaScript payload shipped in the tarball as math_init.js. The payload uses string-array rotation (WV8StW), a 1000+ entry numeric-index string array (n7gIxM), and identifier mangling (_0xNNNNNN); it carries a @bun @bun-cjs banner indicating it is bundled specifically to run under the freshly downloaded Bun runtime, bypassing Node-level static and runtime observation. The rest of the package (index.js) is the small ESLint config consistent with the advertised name, so the dropper is wholly unrelated to the declared purpose. Behavior fires automatically on npm install. The delta between the advertised purpose (an ESLint config) and the shipped runtime-download + obfuscated-payload behavior is consistent with a compromised release of the @ornikar/* scope rather than an authentic maintainer publish.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.