@orion-design-system/storenpm
Malicious code in @orion-design-system/store (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall script that runs on every npm install. The script uses node -e to require os and https, reads os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username, and exfiltrates them to d8kn5vlt5p5h1j34mbcgbx1nffwjobfoh.oast.fun (an Interactsh OAST callback host) via both an HTTPS GET with the values in the query string and a DNS lookup with the hostname embedded in the subdomain. The package combines this active exfiltration with a textbook Alex Birsan dependency-confusion shape: an internal-looking scope (@orion-design-system), an absurdly high version (9999.0.0) designed to win version resolution against a private registry, and a README that explicitly names the target organization (Cloud Imperium Games / Roberts Space Industries). Any build system misconfigured to resolve the public copy over a private internal package will leak host identifiers to the attacker-controlled OAST endpoint at install time. 'Authorized research' framing in the README does not neutralize the install-time payload — the script fires unconditionally on any installer that resolves this package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @orion-design-system/store (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @orion-design-system/store across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@orion-design-system/store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @orion-design-system/store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @orion-design-system/store before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @orion-design-system/store-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.