@origindev/ethaccountnpm

@origindev/[email protected] ships a single heavily obfuscated index.js wrapped in an RC4 string-array decoder with IIFE rotation and a self-defending regex guard. All literal strings — including the require target, the exported method name, the HTTP method, and the destination URL — are encrypted across eight concatenated fragments, preventing static auditing of the network destination. The module exports one function (internal name wallets) that takes a single argument and unconditionally issues axios.<method>(API_BASE_URL + arg) to a hardcoded author-controlled endpoint, silently swallowing any error. Combined with the package name ethaccount, the description "evm tool for validation entry", and the exported function name wallets, the obvious intent is for callers to pass wallet/account material (private keys, seed phrases, or account identifiers) which is then forwarded to the attacker. The published manifest also diverges from the README, which instructs npm install evm_account — a different package name — indicating impersonation of an unrelated target. The author field is blank, there is no documented purpose for the relay, and the destination is deliberately concealed.