Which versions of @or-sdk/content-request are malicious?

The following npm versions of @or-sdk/content-request are flagged malicious: 0.2.6, 0.2.7, 0.2.8. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @or-sdk/content-request if I installed it?

@or-sdk/content-request is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @or-sdk/content-request — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @or-sdk/content-request was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @or-sdk/content-request part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @or-sdk/content-request is associated with the GHSA-rp58-mm4c-793q, IN-MAL-2026-013857, IN-MAL-2026-014105, IN-MAL-2026-013990 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @or-sdk/content-request across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @or-sdk/content-request (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @or-sdk/content-request across your stack and pipelines.

Part of a larger attack: @or-sdk published 74 malicious packages. See the full campaign →

Malicious package

@or-sdk/content-requestnpm

@or-sdk/content-request is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11684) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.2.6, 0.2.7, 0.2.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @or-sdk/content-request (npm)

MAL-2026-11684

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @or-sdk/content-request

What this malware does

npm/@or-sdk/content-request is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall script runs node setup.mjs, which fetches the Bun runtime binary from a hardcoded GitHub release URL, extracts and chmods it, and then invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js shipped in the tarball. math_init.js is ~727KB, single-line, and heavily obfuscated: a large string-array (n7gIxM), a rotation function (WV8StW), and a custom base-alphabet decoder (hc1jfK9) hide its real behavior behind a // @bun @bun-cjs header, and its filename does not correspond to the package's advertised content-request SDK purpose. setup.mjs itself is written in obfuscator.io-style form with hex-named identifiers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e) and per-call string-lookup objects, further concealing the download-and-exec chain. On npm install, the alternate Bun runtime is used to execute the opaque payload outside the Node inspection surface, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

0.2.60.2.70.2.8

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

34ef50681b253ca9de7e0108d4e4fb585ddd6f3aa86a3c418acb33f4668ecf70

56e0d556555209341c632eca15bd6a053badfded6521b7cdc3d6f0db2bddf587

d7bfea5f05eca7fa261b8d7a2b7e3bcffa0a69545f93897fd7e09f903caa4b0c

283b0a30246b423f9e50ecb2174adf8637e38a8857257b06ab1493424bffe5d7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @or-sdk/content-request (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @or-sdk/content-request across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@or-sdk/content-request is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @or-sdk/content-request was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @or-sdk/content-request before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @or-sdk/content-request on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.2.6, 0.2.7, 0.2.8 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-rp58-mm4c-793qIN-MAL-2026-013857IN-MAL-2026-014105IN-MAL-2026-013990

References

Credits

Aikido Security · finder
Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder
Socket Threat Research Team · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @or-sdk/content-request-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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