@onum-releases/sdknpm
Malicious code in @onum-releases/sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import, index.js reads the installer's machine hostname via os.hostname(), embeds it as a subdomain of a hardcoded *.oastify.com (Burp Collaborator out-of-band callback) host, and issues an HTTPS GET to that host. Specifically, index.js lines 5-7 build sdk.<hostname>.200majoeu01dk02xnjdajro1isojc90y.oastify.com and call https.get({ host: host, path: '/sdk',... }). The fetch fires unconditionally on require('@onum-releases/sdk') with no caller consent, leaking the installer's hostname (via both DNS and HTTPS) to whoever controls that Collaborator instance. The package's own description says 'Security PoC placeholder - benign, no runtime payload', but the shipped code does run an import-time beacon. The @onum-releases scope plus PoC framing is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe against an internal onum namespace; the harm to any installer who pulls it (intentionally or via name confusion) is host-identifier exfiltration to a third-party OAST server.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @onum-releases/sdk (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @onum-releases/sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@onum-releases/sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @onum-releases/sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @onum-releases/sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @onum-releases/sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.