@onescience/onecodenpm
@onescience/onecode is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10717) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.14.50-202607161038, 1.14.50-202607161139, 1.14.50-202607161642…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @onescience/onecode (npm)
What this malware does
The npm postinstall hook runs ensurePlatformBinary(), which downloads a.tgz archive from the hardcoded bare-IP URL https://218.90.133.98:4443/onecode_tgz/onecode-<ver>/onecode-linux-x64-<ver>.tgz, extracts it via tar -xzf, chmods the extracted file to 0o755, hardlinks it into bin/.onecode, and the shipped CLI launcher invokes it. The HTTPS request explicitly sets rejectUnauthorized: false, disabling TLS certificate verification, and no hash or signature check is performed on the downloaded artifact. The download destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port, not a publisher-owned domain or a recognized release host. The package name and launcher (@onescience/onecode) mirror the unrelated 'opencode' project — env-var fallbacks reference OPENCODE_BIN_PATH and bundled asset directories are named.opencode/session-seed and.opencode/oneskills — while the executable payload is retrieved from an unrelated hardcoded IP endpoint. Anyone controlling that host, or any on-path network attacker (TLS is disabled), can deliver arbitrary code that executes on every installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @onescience/onecode (54 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @onescience/onecode across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @onescience/onecode from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @onescience/onecode was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @onescience/onecode before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @onescience/onecode-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.