@onereach/si-step-choosernpm

npm/@onereach/si-step-chooser is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

@onereach/[email protected] is published as a Vue step-chooser UI component (module: lib/component.js) but ships a preinstall lifecycle hook that runs an alien-runtime dropper. package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is obfuscated (identifiers like _0x...) and, at install time, downloads a platform-specific Bun 1.3.13 binary zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts the Bun executable to a tempdir, chmods it 0755, and execFileSync's it against a sibling file math_init.js located in the package directory. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) obfuscated with a custom string-array rotation (WV8StW shift routine) and a large charmap literal decoded at runtime by hc1jfK9. The filename 'math_init.js' has no relationship to the advertised Vue component purpose. The net effect is that npm install of this package fetches a second runtime and executes opaque author-controlled bytes on the installer's machine, bypassing Node-based inspection. The behavior is inconsistent with the package's declared purpose, and the payload's contents cannot be inspected without executing them under Bun.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.