@onereach/si-codenpm

npm/@onereach/si-code is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The npm package @onereach/[email protected] declares a preinstall script that runs setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads a Bun runtime archive from oven-sh's GitHub releases (or uses a local bun binary if present), extracts it, chmod +x's the binary, and executes the sibling file math_init.js under Bun via execFileSync. math_init.js is a 727 KB single-line Bun-compiled bundle using shuffled string-array obfuscation (WV8StW shift routine over a large n7gIxM constant array). setup.mjs itself is obfuscated with _0xNNNN identifiers and per-function string dictionaries that dispatch every literal ("ldd", "/etc/os-release", "bun", etc.). The advertised purpose of the package is a Vue/joi/vuelidate form-input component, whose legitimate code lives under lib/. package.json declares "files": ["lib/*"], but the tarball also ships setup.mjs and math_init.js at the root — outside the declared publish surface. The install-time payload therefore runs under an alternate language runtime that cannot be inspected by Node-based static analysis of the tarball, its content is obfuscated at both layers, its behavior is unrelated to the advertised form-component functionality, and its presence is inconsistent with the author's declared file manifest.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.