@onereach/si-checkbox-groupnpm

npm/@onereach/si-checkbox-group is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package advertises itself as a Vue checkbox UI component but ships a preinstall script (node setup.mjs) that downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases and uses it to execute a bundled 727KB obfuscated JavaScript file (math_init.js) on the installer's host at install time. Both the launcher (setup.mjs) and the payload are heavily obfuscated: setup.mjs uses obfuscator.io-style _0x-prefixed identifier mangling with per-scope constant-proxy objects; math_init.js uses a rotating string-array cipher (WV8StW push/shift over a ~500-element mixed literal/hex array). Executing the payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime (Bun) rather than Node evades Node-based tooling and sandboxing. A UI checkbox library has no legitimate need for a Bun runtime, a bootstrap named math_init, or install-time obfuscated code execution — the combination is the alternate-runtime-dropper attack shape, granting the publisher arbitrary code execution on every installer's machine at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.