@onereach/phonenumber-interpreternpm

npm/@onereach/phonenumber-interpreter is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares a preinstall script node setup.mjs. setup.mjs (itself obfuscated with _0x-hex identifiers and string-array indirection) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/...zip, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and uses execFileSync to run the tarball-shipped math_init.js under Bun on any npm install. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled CJS module (// @bun @bun-cjs) using obfuscator.io-style transforms: shuffled string array rotated via push(shift()), hex-mangled identifiers, and a mixed integer/char decoder table; static extraction of its strings surfaces child_process and .aws references. The package advertises itself as a libphonenumber wrapper and has no legitimate need for a second JavaScript runtime to execute a large obfuscated blob at install time. Corroborating smuggling signal: package.json declares "files": ["lib", "index.js", "index.d.ts"], but the tarball also ships setup.mjs and math_init.js — the entire attack surface lives outside the declared files allowlist. Bun is used specifically because Node-oriented scanners do not follow into a Bun-executed sibling file, so the payload's actual behavior is hidden from most SCA tooling. The Bun runtime is fetched from its official project domain, but the harm is not the runtime fetch — it is the execution of an obfuscated, mismatched-purpose, undeclared payload shipped inside the tarball under that runtime.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.