@onereach/orest-vue-demi-vue2npm

npm/@onereach/orest-vue-demi-vue2 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Package advertises itself as a trivial vue-demi re-export shim (dist/index.mjs is ~4KB of globalThis['VueDemi'] proxy exports), but its package.json declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that downloads a Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temporary directory, extracts it, chmods the binary to 0o755, and invokes it via execFileSync to run a bundled sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a single ~728KB line prefixed // @bun @bun-cjs, obfuscated with a string-array shuffle routine (WV8StW pushes/shifts a large numeric/string literal array) and hex-named identifiers. The payload executes under a freshly downloaded alternate JS runtime at npm install time, sidestepping inspection of what the bundle actually does. A vue-demi shim has no functional need for an alternate runtime or a 728KB opaque bundle; the shim exports are a cover for install-time execution of attacker-controlled code. The @onereach/orest-vue-demi-vue2 name and the vue-demi surface further mimic a legitimate ecosystem package the installer might expect to be safe.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.