@onereach/idw-sdknpm

npm/@onereach/idw-sdk is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that runs on npm install. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style hex identifiers and constant-property lookup wrappers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e, YCZJE, QkQej, TdVzu) that hide its strings and control flow. On install the script probes the host, and if Bun is not already installed it downloads a Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platform>.zip into a temp directory, unpacks it, chmods it executable, then invokes that freshly dropped Bun binary against a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync. If Bun is already present, that Bun is used to execute math_init.js directly. math_init.js is a ~727 KB Bun-compiled file (// @bun @bun-cjs) with string-array-rotator obfuscation (WV8StW rotating a large mixed array; randomized identifiers such as MmgoCP, JqTtnbZ, hc1jfK9) that makes the payload body deliberately unreadable to Node-based reviewers and scanners. The package's advertised purpose is a typed axios HTTP client for the IDW API, which has no need to fetch a second JavaScript runtime at install time or to ship a large obfuscated Bun-compiled artifact. The combination — obfuscated preinstall dropper + alternate-runtime fetch + auto-execution of an opaque bundled payload — is an install-time remote code execution surface running on every installer's machine.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.